

# The neuroscience of probability

Wei Ji Ma


Baylor College of Medicine




$10^{10}$ - $10^{11}$  neurons

Each neuron has  $10^3$ - $10^4$  synaptic connections

# Neuron diversity




Optic tectum of the sparrow  
Ramón y Cajal, 1905



R. Stufflebeam, The Mind Project  
Based on drawings by Cajal

# Circuit diagram of macaque visual areas



Felleman and Van Essen, 1991

# Levels of organization




Figure 2.1 Levels of organization in the nervous system, as characterized by Gordon Shepherd (1988a).

Difficult question:

How to model the brain?

# Simulating the brain bottom-up



Model neocortical microcircuit

What?

Why?




# Why do we have a brain?



Essential function: using sensory information to guide behavior

# Top-down view: Start with behavior



**Goal:** to understand the relationship between neural and mental states in quantitative terms

**Approach:** normative/optimality: what *should* the brain be doing? → is it really doing that?

**System:** perception in humans

# Gareth Oliver – Britain's Got Talent 2009



# How is our brain fooled into thinking that the puppet is talking?



**Hypothesis 1: The puppet is talking.**

Support:- We see that the puppet's movements match the speech.  
- We see that the human's face isn't moving.

**Hypothesis 2: The human is talking.**

Support:- We know that most puppets don't come with sound.  
- We (kind of) hear the sound coming from the human.

# How does our brain decide between these two hypotheses?

- Optimal: compute the *probability* of each from the observations and prior knowledge.
  - probability that the puppet is talking given observations**
  - probability that the human is talking given observations**
- What is perceived is the hypothesis with the highest probability.
- Claim: *all perception* consists of computing probabilities

Computing probabilities means we are uncertain.

Why can't we be certain?

# Low-quality input



It's dark



Visibility is low



Stuff is far away




Stuff happens in the periphery




Noise in the brain




# Ambiguity



a trapezoid




a rectangle on a road



a weird wire frame

Low-quality input



Ambiguity



Uncertainty



Probability

# Perception as inference

- The brain, forced to interpret *low-quality* and *ambiguous* observations, computes probabilities: **(probabilistic) inference**.

probability of hypothesis given observations

$p(\text{hypothesis} \mid \text{observations})$

- The brain is not a recording device!



Interpretation



Inference



Al Hazen (Ibn al-Haytham), 965-1040

“Perception requires unnoticed judgments.”



Pierre-Simon Laplace, 1749-1827

“One may even say, strictly speaking, that almost all our knowledge is only probable.”



Hermann von Helmholtz, 1821-1894

“Perception is unconscious inference.”

Is almost all our knowledge only probable?

Do we compute  $p$  (hypothesis | observations) ?

Let's look at daily life!

# Perception...



$p(\text{that is my friend} \mid \text{visual information})$



$p(\text{memo is present on desk} \mid \text{messy visual information})$



# Prediction...



$p(\text{it will rain} \mid \text{atmospheric data})$



$p(\text{I will get sick if I eat this apple} \mid \text{look, smell})$



$p(\text{my teammate will catch the ball} \mid \text{peripheral visual information})$



$p(\text{I can jump over the stream} \mid \text{visual information, jumping ability})$

# Complex decision-making...

How did you decide to come here?

$p(\text{this is an interesting REU} \mid \text{announcement})$



$p(\text{this is a nice place to work} \mid \text{first impression})$

$p(\text{this is the guy we need} \mid \text{first impression})$



$p(\text{he's the one} \mid \text{his behavior})$



$p(\text{it will rain} \mid \text{atmospheric data})$

$p(\text{I will get sick if I eat this apple} \mid \text{look, smell})$

$p(\text{my teammate will catch the ball} \mid \text{peripheral visual information})$

$p(\text{I can jump over the stream} \mid \text{visual information, jumping ability})$

$p(\text{that is my friend} \mid \text{visual information})$

$p(\text{this is a nice place to work} \mid \text{first impression})$

$p(\text{this is the guy we need} \mid \text{first impression})$

$p(\text{he's the one} \mid \text{his behavior})$



**$p(\text{hypothesis} \mid \text{observations})$**

The brain interprets.

Probabilities are everywhere.


All yes/no variables!





... but easily extends to variables with >2 possible values



$p(\text{stress} \quad | \text{headache})$   
 $p(\text{hangover} \quad | \text{headache})$   
 $p(\text{brain tumor} | \text{headache})$   
 $p(\text{other} \quad \quad | \text{headache})$



... and to *continuous* variables



“We (kind of) hear the sound coming from the human.”



A small experiment...

# How does the brain decide who's talking?

## Prior knowledge:

$$p(\text{puppet talking}) = 0.20$$

$$p(\text{human talking}) = 0.80$$



## Probabilities given observations:

$$p(\text{puppet talking} \mid \text{visual observations}) = 0.95$$

$$p(\text{human talking} \mid \text{visual observations}) = 0.05$$

$$p(\text{puppet talking} \mid \text{auditory observations}) = 0.40$$

$$p(\text{human talking} \mid \text{auditory observations}) = 0.60$$

## Optimally combined probabilities:

$$\frac{p(\text{puppet talking} \mid \text{observations})}{p(\text{human talking} \mid \text{observations})} = \frac{0.20}{0.80} \times \frac{0.95}{0.05} \times \frac{0.40}{0.60} = 3.2$$

→ It is more probable that the puppet is talking!

# Bayes' rule

posterior probability

$p(\text{hypothesis} | \text{observations}) \propto$

$p(\text{observations} | \text{hypothesis}) p(\text{hypothesis})$


likelihood of hypothesis

prior probability


# Example: object recognition

$s$ : object identity


image data  $I$




Prior over objects  
 $p(s)$



Likelihood over objects given 2D image  
 $L(s) = p(I|s)$



Posterior over objects  
 $p(s|I)$




$$p(s_1|I) = p_1$$

$$p(s_2|I) = p_2$$

$$p(s_3|I) = p_3$$

Perceive the object with  
the highest posterior  
probability


$$p(s_3|I) = p_3 \text{ is biggest}$$






Many perceptual effects can be explained as consequences of Bayesian inference.


# Ponzo illusion





# Checkerboard shadow illusion



Edward H. Adelson



# Uninformative likelihood: Necker cube



Prior probability comes to the rescue:

$$\frac{p(s = \text{Cube 1} | I)}{p(s = \text{Cube 2} | I)} = \frac{p(I | s = \text{Cube 1}) p(s = \text{Cube 1})}{p(I | s = \text{Cube 2}) p(s = \text{Cube 2})} \approx \frac{p(s = \text{Cube 1})}{p(s = \text{Cube 2})}$$

# Uninformative likelihoods in nature



Peppered moth caterpillar  
*Biston betularia*  
Noor et al., PLOS ONE 2008

# Uninformative likelihood: hidden messages?



Led Zeppelin, *Stairway to heaven* (1971)



Played backwards



Satanism?

# Or the Story of Aidan?

Daniel Goldreich and lab, McMaster University

***Aidan and the Quicksand:** In a faraway land, a little boy named Aidan wanders lost in the wilderness. Desperate, his father consults a shaman who can hear the "broken music" of the spirit world. The shaman reports that Aidan made a campfire for warmth, but that the fire burned out as the wood turned to ash. Ash ("quicksand") is an evil power that, unchecked by the heat of fire, escapes to engulf its victims. Aidan's father sings this lament: ...*



# How to do science on this?

- Theory: the human brain optimally computes probabilities in making perceptual judgments
- Experimental test: measure human responses in a controlled behavioral task (psychophysics)
- Compare with alternative theories



# Speech recognition gone wild




Demo from

[http://www.media.uio.no/personer/arntm/McGurk\\_english.html](http://www.media.uio.no/personer/arntm/McGurk_english.html)



# McGurk effect




McGurk and MacDonald, Nature 1976

# Why does this happen?

- Hypotheses: “ba”, “ga”, “da”, other syllables
- Noisy auditory (A) evidence for “ba”
- Noisy visual (V) evidence for “ga”
- The brain computes  $p(\text{syllable} \mid A, V)$ : *cue combination*


# Generative model




Bayes' rule  $\rightarrow$

$$p(s | x_A, x_V) \propto p(x_A | s) p(x_V | s)$$

# Computing the posterior



What was  $s$ ?




Weighted average:

$$\hat{s} = \frac{w_A x_A + w_V x_V}{w_A + w_V} \quad \text{where} \quad w_A = \frac{1}{\sigma_A^2} \quad \text{and} \quad w_V = \frac{1}{\sigma_V^2}$$

The Bayesian observer weighs cues by their reliabilities, on a single trial.

Do humans do this?

# Example: ventriloquist effect





.....

# Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion

Marc O. Ernst\* & Martin S. Banks

Vision Science Program/School of Optometry, University of California  
94720-2020, USA

.....

Robert J. van Beers · Anne C. Sittig  
Jan J. Denier van der Gon

# How humans combine simultaneous proprioceptive and visual position information

Current Biology, Vol. 14, 257–262, February 3, 2004, ©2004 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

# The Ventriloquist Effect Results from Near-Optimal Bimodal Integration

David Alais<sup>1,2</sup> and David Burr<sup>1,3,\*</sup>

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Italy

<sup>2</sup>Auditory Neuroscience Laboratory  
Department of Physiology  
University of Sydney  
New South Wales 2006  
Australia

<sup>3</sup>Department of Psychology  
University of Florence  
50125 Florence  
Italy

# Lip-Reading Aids Word Recognition in Noise: A Bayesian Explanation Using Feature Space

Wei Ji Ma<sup>1,3,\*</sup>, Xiang Zhou<sup>2,3</sup>, Lars A. Ross<sup>3,4</sup>, John J. Foxe<sup>3,4,5</sup>, Lucas

<sup>1</sup> Department of Neuroscience, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, United States of America, <sup>2</sup> Department of Psychology, New York University, United States of America, <sup>3</sup> Program in Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, New York University, United States of America, <sup>4</sup> The Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Program in Cognitive Neuroscience and Schizophrenia, Orangeburg, New York, United States of America, <sup>5</sup> Program in Neuropsychology, Department of Psychology, Queens College of the City University of New York, Flushing, New York, United States of America

# Optimal integration of texture and motion cues to depth

Robert A. Jacobs \*

Center for Visual Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA

Received 10 October 2003; revised 11 February 2004; accepted 21 March 1999

# Motion illusions as optimal percepts

Yair Weiss<sup>1</sup>, Eero P. Simoncelli<sup>2</sup> and Edward H. Adelson<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> School of Computer Science and Engineering, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram Campus, Jerusalem 91904, Israel

<sup>2</sup> Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Center for Neural Science and Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University,  
<sup>4</sup> Washington Place, New York, New York 10003, USA

<sup>3</sup> Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA

Correspondence should be addressed to

# Do humans optimally integrate stereo and texture information for judgments of surface slant?



David C. Knill \*, Jeffrey A. Saunders

Center for Visual Sciences, University of Rochester, 274 Meliora Hall, Rochester, NY 14627, USA

Received 2 December 2002; received in revised form 22 April 2003

# Is something wrong with the brain?

- We perceive a puppet to be talking...  
We hear speech that is not there...  
Are we delusional?!
- Nothing wrong! The brain uses probabilities that are correct based on *normally occurring stimuli*.
- In illusions, the stimuli/task are artificially created to make those probabilities misleading.



# Two questions about neural states


- How do neurons encode probability distributions? (*representation*)
- How do neurons perform Bayesian inference? (*computation*)

# Hubel and Wiesel





4:10

# Tuning curve of a single neuron



Macaque V1  
Shapley et al., 2003


# Tuning curve of a single neuron



Macaque S2  
Pruett et al., 2000


# Idealized tuning curve

Mean response as a function of the stimulus






# Models of tuning curves




# Variability around the mean response



Response distribution:  $p(r | s)$

What functional form?



Trial 1: 7 spikes

Trial 2: 5 spikes

Trial 3: 3 spikes

Trial 4: 6 spikes

# Poisson variability



- Discrete distribution (spike counts)

$$p(r | s) = \frac{e^{-f(s)} f(s)^r}{r!}$$

- $r$  is an integer,  $f(s)$  not necessarily
- Mean of  $r$ :

$$\langle r \rangle = \sum_{r=0}^{\infty} r p(r | s) = f(s)$$


# Histograms of a Poisson random variable



# Fano factor


$$\text{Fano factor} = \frac{\text{variance of spike count}}{\text{mean spike count}}$$

Poisson process: Fano factor = 1




Physiology: Fano factor in range 0.3 to 1.8

# Single neuron – response variability




# Population of neurons




What is unrealistic about this picture?

# Population activity on a single trial





# Population activity – variability



Response distribution

(noise distribution):  $p(\mathbf{r} | s)$

# Independent Poisson variability

One neuron: 
$$p(r | s) = \frac{e^{-f(s)} f(s)^r}{r!}$$


Population: 
$$p(\mathbf{r} | s) = \prod_{i=1}^N \frac{e^{-f_i(s)} f_i(s)^{r_i}}{r_i!}$$

If not independent, then *noise correlations*


# Population codes in the brain

- Primary visual cortex (orientation, spatial frequency)
- MT (motion direction, velocity)
- IT (human faces, objects)
- SC (saccade direction)
- Primary motor cortex (arm movement direction)
- Hippocampus in rat (self location)
- Cercal interneurons in cricket (wind direction)
- Prefrontal cortex (numerosity)

Why population coding and not single-neuron coding?




# Decoding a probability distribution




$$p(s | \mathbf{r}) \propto p(\mathbf{r} | s) p(s)$$

↓  
population variability

# Computation with population codes




# Integrate-and-fire network




# Network performs near-optimally

Mean estimates



Estimate variance



- Same tuning curves, same covariance matrices
- + Same tuning curves, different covariance matrices
- x Different tuning curves, different covariance matrices



# Testing predictions...

nature  
neuroscience

## Neural correlates of multisensory cue integration in macaque MSTd

Yong Gu<sup>1</sup>, Dora E Angelaki<sup>1,3</sup> & Gregory C DeAngelis<sup>1-3</sup>

Neuron  
Article

### Multisensory Integration in Macaque Visual Cortex Depends on Cue Reliability

Michael L. Morgan,<sup>1</sup> Gregory C. DeAngelis,<sup>2,3</sup> and Dora E. Angelaki<sup>1,3,\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO 63110, USA


<sup>2</sup>Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Center for Visual Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA

<sup>3</sup>These authors contributed equally to this work


\*Correspondence: [angelaki@pcg.wustl.edu](mailto:angelaki@pcg.wustl.edu)

DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.06.024


# More complex forms of inference




Cue integration



Invariant perception (discounting)




Causal inference



Visual search

# Your brain is an inference machine

- The brain *interprets*, not just transmits, sensory input.
- The brain *computes posterior probabilities* to interpret the world: Bayesian inference
- Many *illusions* can be explained as consequences of probabilistic inference.
- *Humans are Bayesian observers* in many psychophysical tasks. They weigh observations by reliability.
- Explaining human *behavior* using a Bayesian model can elucidate underlying *neural processes*.



**"It's not an optical illusion, Madame, it just  
looks that way!"**